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Abstract
A widely studied process of influence diffusion in social networks posits that the dy-
namics of influence diffusion evolves as follows: Given a graph G = (V,E), representing
the network, initially only the members of a given S ⊆ V are influenced; subsequently,
at each round, the set of influenced nodes is augmented by all the nodes in the network
that have a sufficiently large number of already influenced neighbors. The general prob-
lem is to find a small initial set of nodes that influences the whole network. In this paper
we extend the previously described basic model in the following ways: firstly, we assume
that there are non negative values c(v) associated to each node v ∈ V , measuring how
much it costs to initially influence node v, and the algorithmic problem is to find a set of
nodes of minimum total cost that influences the whole network; successively, we study the
consequences of giving incentives to member of the networks, and we quantify how this
affects (i.e., reduces) the total costs of starting process that influences the whole network.
For the two above problems we provide both hardness and algorithmic results. We also
experimentally validate our algorithms via extensive simulations on real life networks.
Keywords: Social Networks; Spread of Influence; Viral Marketing
1 Introduction
Social influence is the process by which individuals adjust their opinions, revise their beliefs,
or change their behaviors as a result of interactions with other people. It has not escaped the
attention of advertisers that the natural human tendency to conform can be exploited in viral
∗A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 22nd International Colloquium on Structural Informa-
tion and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO 2015), Montserrat, Spain, July 15 - 17, 2015
1
marketing [30]. Viral marketing refers to the spread of information about products and behav-
iors, and their adoption by people. For what strictly concerns us, the intent of maximizing the
spread of viral information across a network naturally suggests many interesting optimization
problems. Some of them were first articulated in the seminal papers [27, 28], under various
adoption paradigms. The recent monograph [8] contains an excellent description of the area.
In the next section, we will explain and motivate our model of information diffusion, state the
problems that we plan to investigate, describe our results, and discuss how they relate to the
existing literature.
1.1 The Model
Let G = (V,E) be a graph modeling a social network. We denote by ΓG(v) = {u ∈ V :
(v, u) ∈ E} and by dG(v) = |ΓG(v)|, respectively, the neighborhood and the degree of vertex
v in G. Let S ⊆ V , and let t : V → N = {1, 2, . . .} be a function assigning integer thresholds
to the vertices of G; we assume w.l.o.g. that 1 ≤ t(u) ≤ d(u) holds for all v ∈ V . For each
node v ∈ V , the value t(v) quantifies how hard it is to influence node v, in the sense that easy-
to-influence elements of the network have “low” t(·) values, and hard-to-influence elements
have “high” t(·) values [25]. An activation process in G starting at S ⊆ V is a sequence
ActiveG[S, 0] ⊆ ActiveG[S, 1] ⊆ . . . ⊆ ActiveG[S, ℓ] ⊆ . . . ⊆ V
of vertex subsets1, with ActiveG[S, 0] = S, and such that for all ℓ > 0,
ActiveG[S, ℓ] = ActiveG[S, ℓ− 1] ∪
{
u :
∣∣ΓG(u) ∩ ActiveG[S, ℓ− 1]∣∣ ≥ t(u)}.
In words, at each round ℓ the set of active (i.e, influenced) nodes is augmented by the set of
nodes u that have a number of already activated neighbors greater or equal to u’s threshold
t(u). We say that v is activated at round ℓ > 0 if v ∈ ActiveG[S, ℓ] − ActiveG[S, ℓ − 1]. A
target set for G is a set S that will activate the whole network, that is, ActiveG[S, ℓ] = V , for
some ℓ ≥ 0. The classical Target Set Selection (TSS) problem (see e.g. [1, 15]) is defined as
follows:
TARGET SET SELECTION.
Instance: A network G = (V,E) with thresholds t : V −→ N.
Problem: Find a target set S ⊆ V of minimum size for G.
The TSS Problem has roots in the general study of the spread of influence in Social Networks
(see [14, 8, 21]). For instance, in the area of viral marketing [20], companies wanting to pro-
mote products or behaviors might initially try to target and convince a set of individuals (by
offering free copies of the products or some equivalent monetary rewards) who, by word-of-
mouth, can successively trigger a cascade of influence in the network leading to an adoption
1We will omit the subscript G whenever the graph G is clear from the context.
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of the products by a much larger number of individuals. In order to make the model more
realistic, we extend the previously described basic model in two ways: First, we assume that
there are non negative values c(v) associated to each vertex v ∈ V , measuring how much it
costs to initially convince the member v of the network to endorse a given product/behavior.
Indeed, that different members of the network have different activation costs (see [2], for ex-
ample) is justified by the observation that celebrities or public figures can charge more for their
endorsements of products. Therefore, we are lead to our first extension of the TSS problem:
WEIGHTED TARGET SET SELECTION (WTSS).
Instance: A network G = (V,E), thresholds t : V → N, costs c : V → N.
Problem: Find a target set S ⊆ V of minimum cost C(S) =
∑
v∈S c(v)
among all target sets for G.
Our second, and more technically challenging, extension of the classical TSS problem is in-
spired by the recent interesting paper [19]. In that paper the authors observed that the basic
model misses a crucial feature of practical applications since it forces the optimizer to make a
binary choice of either zero or complete influence on each individual (for example, either not
offering or offering a free copy of the product to individuals in order to initially convince them
to adopt the product and influence their friends about it). In realistic scenarios, there could be
more reasonable and effective options. For example, a company promoting a new product may
find that offering for free ten copies of a product is far less effective than offering a discount of
ten percent to a hundred of people. Therefore, we formulate our second extension of the basic
model as follows.
Targeting with Partial Incentives. An assignment of partial incentives to the vertices of a
network G = (V,E), with V = {v1, . . . , vn}, is a vector s = (s(v1), . . . , s(vn)), where
s(v) ∈ N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .} represents the amount of influence we initially apply on v ∈ V . The
effect of applying incentive s(v) on node v is to decrease its threshold, i.e., to make individual
v more susceptible to future influence. It is clear that to start the process, there should be a
sufficient number of nodes v’s to which the amount of exercised influence s(v) is at least equal
to their thresholds t(v). Therefore, an activation process in G starting with incentives whose
values are given by the vector s is a sequence of vertex subsets
Active[s, 0] ⊆ Active[s, 1] ⊆ . . . ⊆ Active[s, ℓ] ⊆ . . . ⊆ V,
with Active[s, 0] = {v | s(v) ≥ t(v)}, and such that for all ℓ > 0,
Active[s, ℓ] = Active[s, ℓ− 1] ∪
{
u :
∣∣ΓG(u) ∩ Active[s, ℓ− 1]∣∣ ≥ t(u)− s(u)}.
A target vector s is an assignment of partial incentives that triggers an activation process influ-
encing the whole network, that is, such that Active[s, ℓ] = V for some ℓ ≥ 0. The Targeting
with Partial Incentive problem can be defined as follows:
TARGETING WITH PARTIAL INCENTIVES (TPI).
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Instance: A network G = (V,E), thresholds t : V −→ N.
Problem: Find target vector s which minimizes C(s) =
∑
v∈V s(v).
Notice that the Weighted Target Set Selection problem, when the costs c(v) are always equal
to the thresholds t(v), for each v ∈ V , can be seen as a particular case of Targeting with Partial
Incentives in which the incentives s(v) are set either to 0 or to t(v). Therefore, in a certain
sense, the Targeting with Partial Incentives can be seen as a kind of “fractional” counterpart
of the Weighted Target Set Selection problem (notice, however, that the incentives s(v) are
integer as well). In general, the two optimization problems are quite different since arbitrarily
large gaps are possible between the costs of the solutions of the WTSS and TPI problems, as
the following example shows.
Example 1. Consider the complete graph on n vertices v1, . . . , vn, with thresholds t(v1) =
. . . = t(vn−2) = 1, t(vn−1) = t(vn) = n − 1 and costs equal to the thresholds. An optimal
solution to the WTSS problem consists of either vertex vn−1 or vertex vn, hence of total cost
equal to n − 1. On the other hand, if partial incentives are possible one can assign incentives
s(v1) = s(vn) = 1 and s(vi) = 0 for i = 2, . . . , n − 1, and have an optimal solution of value
equal to 2. Indeed, we have
• Active[s, 0] = {v1}, since t(v1) = s(v1),
• Active[s, 1] = {v1, v2, . . . , vn−2}, since t(vi) = 1 for i = 2, . . . , n − 2,
• Active[s, 2] = {v1, v2, . . . , vn−2, vn}, since t(vn)− s(vn) = n− 2, and
• Active[s, 3] = {v1, v2, . . . , vn−1, vn}, since t(vn−1) = n− 1.
Hence, an optimal solution to the WTSS problem S∗ has C(S∗) = n − 1 while an optimal
vector s∗ has C(s∗) =
∑n
i=1 s
∗(vi) = 2 independent of n.
1.2 Related Works
The algorithmic problems we have articulated have roots in the general study of the spread
of influence in Social Networks (see [8, 21] and references quoted therein). The first authors
to study problems of spread of influence in networks from an algorithmic point of view were
Kempe et al. [27, 28]. They introduced the Influence Maximization problem, where the goal
is to identify a set S ⊆ V such that its cardinality is bounded by a certain budget β and the
activation process activates as much vertices as possible. However, they were mostly interested
in networks with randomly chosen thresholds. Chen [7] studied the following minimization
problem: Given a graph G and fixed arbitrary thresholds t(v), ∀v ∈ V , find a target set of min-
imum size that eventually activates all (or a fixed fraction of) nodes of G. He proved a strong
inapproximability result that makes unlikely the existence of an algorithm with approximation
factor better than O(2log1−ǫ |V |). Chen’s result stimulated a series of papers (see for instance
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[1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39] and references therein
quoted) that isolated many interesting scenarios in which the problem (and variants thereof) be-
come tractable. The Influence Maximization problem with partial incentives was introduced
in [19]. In this model the authors assume that the thresholds are randomly chosen values in the
interval (0, 1) and they aim to understand how a fractional version of the Influence Maximiza-
tion problem differs from the original version. To that purpose, they introduced the concept of
partial influence and showed that, from a theoretical point of view, the fractional version retains
essentially the same computational hardness as the integral version. However, from the prac-
tical side, the authors of [19] proved that it is possible to efficiently compute solutions in the
fractional setting, whose costs are much smaller than the best solutions to the integral version
of the problem. We point out that the model in [19] assumes the existence of functions fv(A)
that quantify the influence of arbitrary subsets of vertices A on each vertex v. In the widely
studied “linear threshold” model, a vertex is influenced by its neighbors only, and such neigh-
bors have the same influencing power fv on v; this is equivalent to the model considered in
this paper. Indeed, a WTSS instance with threshold function t : V → N can be transformed
into an instance with threshold function t′ : V → (0, 1) by setting tmax > maxv∈V t(v),
t′(v) = t(v)/tmax, and fv = 1/tmax, for each vertex v ∈ V . The viceversa holds by setting
t(v) = ⌈t′(v)/fv⌉, for each v ∈ V .
1.3 Our Results
Our main contributions are the following. We first show, in Section 2, that there exists a (gap-
preserving) reduction from the classical TSS problem to our TPI and WTSS problems (for
the WTSS problem, the gap preserving reduction holds also in the particular case in which
c(v) = t(v), for each v ∈ V ). Using the important results by [7], this implies the TPI and
WTSS problems cannot be approximated to within a ratio of O(2log1−ǫ n), for any fixed ǫ > 0,
unless NP ⊆ DTIME(npolylog(n)) (again, for the latter problem this inapproximability result
holds also in the case c(v) = t(v), for each v ∈ V ). Moreover, since the WTSS problem is
equivalent to the TSS problem when all thresholds are equal, the reduction also show that the
particular case in which c(v) = t(v), for each v ∈ V , of the WTSS problem is NP-hard. Again,
this is due to the corresponding hardness result of TSS given in [7].
In Section 3 we present a polynomial time algorithm that, given a network and vertices
thresholds, computes a cost efficient target set. Our polynomial time algorithm exhibits the
following features:
1. For general graphs, it always returns a solution of cost at most equal to
∑
v∈V
c(v)t(v)
dG(v)+1
.
It is interesting to note that, when c(v) = 1 for each v ∈ V , we recover the same upper
bound on the cardinality of an optimal target set given in [1], and proved therein by
means of the probabilistic method.
2. For complete graphs our algorithm always returns a solution of minimum cost.
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In Section 4 we turn our attention to the problem of spreading of influence with incentives
and we propose a polynomial time algorithm that, given a network and vertices thresholds,
computes a cost efficient target vector. Our algorithm exhibits the following features:
1. For general graphs, it always return a solution s (i.e., a target vector) for G of cost
C(s) =
∑
v∈V s(v) ≤
∑
v∈V
t(v)(t(v)+1)
2(dG(v)+1)
.
2. For trees and complete graphs our algorithm always returns an optimal target vector.
Finally, in Section 5 we experimentally validate our algorithms by running them on real life
networks, and we compare the obtained results with that of well known heuristics in the area
(especially tuned to our scenarios). The experiments shows that our algorithms consistently
outperform those heuristics.
2 Hardness of WTSS and TPI
We shall prove the following result.
Theorem 1. WTSS and TPI cannot be approximated within a ratio of O(2log1−ǫ n) for any fixed
ǫ > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(npolylog(n)).
Proof. We first construct a gap-preserving reduction from the TSS problem. The claim of the
theorem follows from the inapproximability of TSS proved in [7]. In the following, we give
the full technical details only for the TPI problem.
Starting from an arbitrary graph G = (V,E) with threshold function t, input instance of
the TSS problem, we build a graph G′ = (V ′, E′) as follows:
• V ′ =
⋃
v∈V V
′
v where V ′v = {v′, v′′, v1, . . . vdG(v)}. In particular,
– we replace each v ∈ V by the gadget Λv (cfr. Fig. 1) in which the vertex set is V ′v
and v′ and v′′ are connected by the disjoint paths (v′, vi, v′′) for i = 1, . . . , dG(v);
– the threshold of v′ in G′ is equal to the threshold t(v) of v in G, while each other
vertex in V ′v has threshold equal to 1.
• E′ = {(v′, u′) | (v, u) ∈ E} ∪
⋃
v∈V {(v
′, vi), (vi, v
′′), for i = 1, . . . , dG(v)}.
Summarizing, G′ is constructed in such a way that for each gadget Λv, the vertex v′ plays
the role of v and is connected to all the gadgets representing neighbors of v in G. Hence, G
corresponds to the subgraph of G′ induced by the set {v′ ∈ V ′v | v ∈ V }. It is worth mentioning
that during an activation process if any vertex that belongs to a gadget Λv is active, then all the
vertices in Λv will be activate within the next 3 rounds.
We claim that there is a target set S ⊆ V for G of cardinality |S| = k if and only if there is a
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Figure 1: The gadget Λv: (left) a generic vertex v ∈ V having degree dG(v) and threshold
t(v); (right) the gadget Λv, having dG(v) + 2 vertices, associated to v.
target vector s for G′ and C(s) =
∑
u∈V ′ s(u) = k.
Assume that S ⊆ V is a target set for G, we can easily build an assignation of partial incentives
s as follows:
s(u) =
{
1 if u is the extremal vertex v′′ in the gadget Λv and v ∈ S;
0 otherwise.
Clearly, C(s) =
∑
v∈S 1 = |S|. To see that s is a target vector we notice that
ActiveG′ [s, 2] = {u | u ∈ V
′
v , v ∈ S}, consequently since S is a target set and G is isomorphic
to the subgraph of G′ induced by {v′ ∈ V ′v | v ∈ V }, all the vertices v ∈ V ′ will be activated.
On the other hand, assume that s is a target vector for G′ and C(s) = k, we can easily build a
target set S
S = {v ∈ V | ∃u ∈ V ′v such that s(u) > 0}.
By construction |S| ≤
∑
u∈V ′ s(u) = C(s). To see that S is a target set for G, for each v ∈ V
we consider two cases on the values s(·):
If there exists u ∈ V ′v such that s(u) > 0 then, by construction v ∈ S.
Suppose otherwise s(u) = 0 for each u ∈ V ′v . We have that in order to activate v′ (and then any
other vertex in Λv) there must exist a round i such that ActiveG′ [s, i− 1] ∩ (V ′ − V ′v) contains
t(v) neighbors of v′. Recall that G is the subgraph of G′ induced by the set {v′ ∈ V ′v | v ∈ V }.
Then for each round i ≥ 0 and for each v′ ∈ ActiveG′ [s, i], we get that the set ActiveG[S, i]
contains the corresponding vertex v. Consequently v will be activated in G. One can see that
the same graph G′ can be used to derive a similar reduction from TSS to WTSS. 
3 The Algorithm for Weighted Target Set Selection
Our algorithm WTSS works by iteratively deleting vertices from the input graph G. At each
iteration, the vertex to be deleted is chosen as to maximize a certain function (Case 3). During
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the deletion process, some vertex v in the surviving graph may remain with less neighbors than
its threshold; in such a case (Case 2) v is added to the target set and deleted from the graph
while its neighbors’ thresholds are decreased by 1 (since they receive v’s influence). It can also
happen that the surviving graph contains a vertex v whose threshold has been decreased down
to 0 (e.g., the deleted vertices are able to activate v); in such a case (Case 1) v is deleted from
the graph and its neighbors’ thresholds are decreased by 1 (since as soon as vertex v activates,
its neighbors will receive v’s influence).
Algorithm 1: Algorithm WTSS(G)
Input: A graph G = (V,E) with thresholds t(v) and costs c(v), for v ∈ V .
Output: A target set S for G.
1 S = ∅;
2 U = V ;
3 foreach v ∈ V do
4 δ(v) = dG(v);
5 k(v) = t(v);
6 N(v) = ΓG(v);
7 while U 6= ∅ do // Select one vertex and eliminate it from the graph.
8 if there exists v ∈ U s.t. k(v) = 0 then // Case 1: The vertex v is activated by the influence of
its neighbors in V − U only; it can then influence its neighbors in U .
9 foreach u ∈ N(v) do
10 k(u) = max(k(u)− 1, 0);
11 else
12 if there exists v ∈ U s.t. δ(v) < k(v) then // Case 2: v is added to S, since not enough
neighbors remain in U to activate it; v can then influence its neighbors in U .
13 S = S ∪ {v};
14 foreach u ∈ N(v) do
15 k(u) = k(u) − 1;
16 else
// Case 3: The vertex v will be activated its neighbors in U .
17 v = argmaxu∈U
{
c(u) k(u)
δ(u)(δ(u)+1)
}
;
18 foreach u ∈ N(v) do // Remove the selected vertex v from the graph.
19 δ(u) = δ(u)− 1;
20 N(u) = N(u)− {v};
21 U = U − {v};
8
Figure 2: The tree of Example 2. The number inside each circle rewpresents the vertex thresh-
old.
Example 2. Consider the tree T in Figure 21. The number inside each circle is the vertex
threshold and c(v) = t(v), for each v. The algorithm removes vertices from T as in the table
below where, for each iteration of the while loop, we give the selected vertex and which among
Cases 1, 2 or 3 applies.
Iteration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Vertex v5 v10 v6 v9 v7 v8 v1 v4 v3 v2
Case 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 2
The set returned by the algorithm is S = {v2, v3, v4, v6, v8}, a target set having cost C(S) = 5.
The algorithm WTSS is a generalization to weighted graphs of the TSS algorithm presented
in [18]. The correctness of the algorithm WTSS does not depend on the cost values, hence it
immediately follows from the correctness proof given in [18]. Moreover a proof on the bound
on the target set size can be immediately obtained from the proof of the corresponding bound
in [18]—by appropriately substituting the threshold value t(v) by the weighted value c(v)t(v)
in the proof.
Theorem 2. For any graph G and threshold function t the algorithm WTSS(G) outputs a target
set for G. The algorithm can be implemented so to run in time O(|E| log |V |). Moreover, the
algorithm WTSS(G) returns a target set S of cost
C(S) ≤
∑
v∈V
c(v)t(v)
dG(v) + 1
. (1)
Theorem 3. The algorithm WTSS(G) outputs an optimal target set if G is a complete graph
such that c(v) ≤ c(u) whenever t(v) ≤ t(u).
Proof. We denote by vi the vertex selected during the n− i+1-th iteration of the while loop in
the algorithm WTSS and by G(i) the graph induced by the vertices vi, . . . , v1, for i = n, . . . , 1.
We show that for each i = 1, . . . , n it holds that S ∩{vi, . . . , v1} is optimal for G(i). Consider
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first G(1) consisting of the isolated vertex v1 with threshold k1(v1). It holds
C(S ∩ {v1}) =
{
C(∅) = 0 if k1(v1) = 0
C({v1}) = c(v1) if k1(v1) > 0
which is optimal. Suppose now C(S ∩ {vi−1, . . . , v1}) is optimal for G(i − 1) and consider
G(i). The selected vertex is vi.
If ki(vi) = 0 then it is obvious that no optimal solution for G(i) includes the “already” active
vertex vi. Hence, the inductive hypothesis on G(i − 1) implies that C(S ∩ {vi, . . . , v1}) =
C(S ∩ {vi−1, . . . , v1}) is optimal for G(i).
If ki(vi) > δi(vi) = i− 1 then any optimal solution for G(i) includes vertex vi (which cannot
be influenced otherwise) and the optimality follows by the optimality hypothesis on G(i− 1).
If none of the above holds, then 0 < ki(vj) ≤ δi(vj), for each j ≤ i, and c(vi)ki(vi) ≥
c(vj)ki(vj), for each j ≤ i− 1. We show now that there exists at least one optimal solution for
G(i) which does not include vi. Consider an optimal solution S∗i for G(i) and assume vi ∈ S∗i .
Let
v = argmax
1≤j≤i−1
vj /∈S
∗
i
ki(vj).
By hypothesis the costs are ordered according to the initial thresholds of the vertices. Since at
each step either all thresholds are decreased or they are all left equal, we have that c(vj)ki(vj) ≤
c(vh)ki(vh) whenever c(vj) ≤ c(vh). Hence, C(S∗i − {vi} ∪ {v}) ≤ C(S∗i ). Moreover, re-
calling that ki(vi) ≤ δi(vi) we know that S∗i − {vi} ∪ {v} is a solution for G(i).
We have then found an optimal solution that does not contain vi. This fact and the optimality
hypothesis on G(i − 1) imply the optimality of S ∩ {vi, . . . , v1} = S ∩ {vi−1, . . . , v1}. 
4 Targeting with Partial Incentives
In this section, we design an algorithm to efficiently allocate incentives to the vertices of a
network, in such a way that it triggers an influence diffusion process that influences the whole
network. The algorithm is called TPI(G). It is close in spirit to the algorithm WTSS(G), with
some crucial differences. Again the algorithm proceeds by iteratively deleting vertices from the
graph and at each iteration the vertex to be deleted is chosen as to maximize a certain parameter
(Case 2). If, during the deletion process, a vertex v in the surviving graph remains with less
neighbors than its remaining threshold (Case 1), then v’s partial incentive is increased so that
the v’s remaining threshold is at least as large as the number of v’s neighbors in the surviving
graph.
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm TPI(G)
Input: A graph G = (V,E) with thresholds t(v), for each v ∈ V .
Output: s a target vector for G.
1 U = V ;
2 foreach v ∈ V do
3 s(v) = 0; // Partial incentive initially assigned to v.
4 δ(v) = dG(v);
5 k(v) = t(v);
6 N(v) = ΓG(v);
7 while U 6= ∅ do // Select one vertex and either update its incentive or remove it from the graph.
8 if there exists v ∈ U s.t. k(v) > δ(v) then // Case 1: Increase s(v) and update k(v).
9 s(v) = s(v) + k(v) − δ(v);
10 k(v) = δ(v);
11 if k(v)=0 then // here δ(v) = 0.
12 U = U − {v};
13 else // Case 2: Choose a vertex v to eliminate from the graph.
14 v = argmaxu∈U
{
k(u)(k(u)+1)
δ(u)(δ(u)+1)
}
;
15 foreach u ∈ N(v) do
16 δ(u) = δ(u) − 1;
17 N(u) = N(u)− {v};
18 U = U − {v};
Example 3. Consider a complete graph on 7 vertices with thresholds t(v1) = . . . = t(v5) = 1,
t(v6) = t(v7) = 6 (cfr. Fig. 3). A possible execution of the algorithm is summarized below.
At each iteration of the while loop, the algorithm considers the vertices in the order shown in
the table below, where we also indicate for each vertex whether Cases 1 or 2 applies and the
updated value of the partial incentive for the selected vertex:
Iteration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
vertex v7 v6 v6 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
Case 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
Incentive 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
The algorithm TPI(G) outputs the vector of partial incentives having non zero elements
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Figure 3: A complete graph example. The number inside each circle is the vertex threshold.
s(v5) = s(v6) = 1, for which we have
Active[s, 0] = {v5} (since s(v5) = 1 = t(v5))
Active[s, 1] = Active[s, 0] ∪ {v1, v2, v3, v4} = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}
Active[s, 2] = Active[s, 1] ∪ {v6} = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6} (since s(v6) = 1)
Active[s, 3] = Active[s, 2] ∪ {v7} = V.
We first prove the algorithm correctness, next we give a general upper bound on the size∑
v∈V s(v) of its output and prove its optimality for trees and cliques.
To this aim we will use the following notation.
Let ℓ be the number of iterations of the while loop in TPI(G). For each iteration j, with
1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, of the while loop we denote
• byUj the set U at the beginning of the j-th iteration (cfr. line 7 of TPI(G)), in particular
U1 = V (G) and Uℓ+1 = ∅;
• by G(j) the subgraph of G induced by the vertices in Uj ,
• by vj the vertex selected during the j-th iteration2 ,
• by δj(v) the degree of vertex v in G(j),
• by kj(v) the value of the remaining threshold of vertex v in G(j), that is, as it is updated
at the beginning of the j-th iteration, in particular k1(v) = t(v) for each v ∈ V ,
• by sj(v) the partial incentive collected by vertex v in G(j) starting from the j-th iteration,
in particular we set sℓ+1(v) = 0 for each v ∈ V ;
2A vertex can be selected several times before being eliminated; indeed in Case 1 we can have Uj+1 = Uj .
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• by σj the increment of the partial incentives during the j-th iteration, that is,
σj = sj(vj)− sj+1(vj) =
{
0 if kj(vj) ≤ δj(vj),
kj(vj)− δj(vj) otherwise.
According to the above notation, we have that if vertex v is selected during the iterations
j1 < j2 < . . . < ja−1 < ja of the while loop in TPI(G), where the last value ja is the iteration
when v has been eliminated from the graph, then
sj(v) =


σj1 + σj2 + . . .+ σja if j ≤ j1,
σjb + σjb+1 + . . . + σja if jb−1 < j ≤ jb≤ ja,
0 if j > ja.
In particular when j = ja, it holds that sj(v) = σj .
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 1. Consider the vertex vj that is selected during iteration j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, of the
while loop in the algorithm TPI(G):
1.1) If Case 1 of the algorithm TPI(G) holds and δj(vj) = 0, then kj(vj) > δj(vj) = 0 and
the isolated vertex vj is eliminated from G(j). Moreover,
Uj+1 = Uj − {vj}, sj+1(vj) = sj(vj)− σj , σj = kj(vj)− δj(vj) = kj(vj) > 0,
and, for each v∈Uj+1
sj+1(v) = sj(v), δj+1(v) = δj(v), kj+1(v) = kj(v).
1.2) If Case 1 of TPI(G) holds with δj(vj) > 0, then kj(vj) > δj(vj) > 0 and no vertex is
deleted from G(j), that is, Uj+1 = Uj . Moreover,
σj = kj(vj)− δj(vj) > 0
and, for each v ∈ Uj+1
δj+1(v) = δj(v), sj+1(v) =
{
sj(vj)−σj if v = vj
sj(v) if v 6= vj
, kj+1(v) =
{
δj(v) if v = vj
kj(v) if v 6= vj.
2) If Case 2 of TPI(G) holds then kj(vj) ≤ δj(vj) and vj is pruned from G(j). Hence,
Uj+1 = Uj − {vj}, σj = 0,
and, for each v ∈ Uj+1 it holds
sj+1(v) = sj(v), kj+1(v) = kj(v) δj+1(v) =
{
δj(v)− 1 if v ∈ ΓG(j)(vj)
δj(v) otherwise.
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Lemma 1. For each iteration j = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, of the while loop in the algorithm TPI(G),
1) if kj(vj) > δj(vj) then σj = kj(vj)− δj(vj) = 1;
2) if δj(vj) = 0 then sj(vj) = kj(vj).
Proof. First, we prove 1). At the beginning of the algorithm, t(u) = k(u) ≤ d(u) = δ(u)
holds for all u ∈ V . Afterwords, the value of δ(u) is decreased by at most one unit for each
iteration (cfr. line 16 of TPI(G)). Moreover, the first time the condition of Case 1 holds for
some vertex u, one has δj(u) = kj(u)−1. Hence, if the selected vertex is vj = u then 1) holds;
otherwise, some vj 6= u, satisfying the condition of Case 1 is selected and δj+1(u) = δj(u)
and kj+1(u) = kj(u) hold. Hence, when at some subsequent iteration j′ > j the algorithm
selects vj′ = u, it holds δj′(u) = kj′(u)− 1.
To show 2), it is sufficient to notice that at the iteration j when vertex vj is eliminated from the
graph, it holds sj(v) = σj .

Next theorem states the correctness of the algorithm TPI(G) for any graph G.
Theorem 4. For any graph G the algorithm TPI(G) outputs a target vector for G.
Proof. We show that for each iteration j, with 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, the assignation of partial incentives
sj(v) for each v ∈ Uj activates all the vertices of the graph G(j) when the distribution of
thresholds to its vertices is kj(·). The proof is by induction on j.
If j = ℓ then the unique vertex vℓ in G(ℓ) has degree δℓ(vℓ) = 0 and sℓ(vℓ) = kℓ(vℓ) = 1 (see
Lemma 1).
Consider now j < ℓ and suppose the algorithm be correct on G(j + 1) that is, the assignation
of partial incentives sj+1(v), for each v ∈ Uj+1, activates all the vertices of the graph G(j + 1)
when the distribution of thresholds to its vertices is kj+1(·).
Recall that vj denotes the vertex the algorithm selects from Uj (thus obtaining Uj+1, the vertex
set of G(j + 1)). In order to prove the theorem we analyze three cases according to the current
degree and threshold of the selected vertex vj .
• Let kj(vj) > δj(vj) = 0. By Lemma 1, we have kj(vj) = sj(vj). Furthermore,
recalling that 1.1) of Proposition 1 holds and by using the inductive hypothesis on G(j+
1), we get the correctness on G(j) .
• Let kj(vj) > δj(vj) ≥ 1. By recalling that 1.2) of Proposition 1 holds we get kj(v) −
sj(v) = kj+1(v) − sj+1(v), for each vertex v ∈ Uj . Indeed, for each v 6= vj we have
kj+1(v) = kj(v) and sj+1(v) = sj(v). Moreover,
kj+1(vj)− sj+1(vj) = δj(vj)− sj(vj) + σj = kj(vj)− sj(vj).
Hence the vertices that can be activated in G(j + 1) can be activated in G(j) with
thresholds kj(·) and partial incentives sj(·). So, by using the inductive hypothesis on
G(j + 1), we get the correctness on G(j).
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• Let kj(vj) ≤ δj(vj). By recalling that 2) of Proposition 1 holds and by the inductive
hypothesis on G(j + 1) we have that all the neighbors of vj in G(j) that are vertices in
Uj+1 gets active; since kj(vj) ≤ δj(vj) also vj activates in G(j).

We now give an upper bound on the size of the solution returned by the algorithm TPI.
Theorem 5. For any graph G the algorithm TPI(G) returns a target vector s for G such that
C(s) =
∑
v∈V
s(v) ≤
∑
v∈V
t(v)(t(v) + 1)
2(dG(v) + 1)
Proof. Define B(j) =
∑
v∈Uj
kj(v)(kj (v)+1)
2(δj (v)+1)
, for each j = 1, . . . , ℓ. By definition of ℓ, we
have G(ℓ + 1) is the empty graph; we then define B(ℓ + 1) = 0. We prove now by induction
on j that
σj ≤ B(j) − B(j + 1). (2)
By using (2) we will have the bound on∑v∈V s(v). Indeed,
∑
v∈V
s(v) =
ℓ∑
j=1
σj ≤
ℓ∑
j=1
(B(j)−B(j+1)) = B(1)−B(ℓ+1) = B(1) =
∑
v∈V
t(v)(t(v) + 1)
2(d(v) + 1)
.
In order to prove (2), we analyze three cases depending on the relation between kj(vj) and
δj(vj).
• Assume first kj(vj) > δj(vj) = 0. We get
B(j) − B(j+1) =
∑
v∈Uj
kj(v)(kj(v) + 1)
2(δj(v) + 1)
−
∑
v∈Uj+1
kj+1(v)(kj+1(v) + 1)
2(δj+1(v) + 1)
=
kj(vj)(kj(vj) + 1)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
+
∑
v∈Uj−{vj}
kj(v)(kj(v) + 1)
2(δj(v) + 1)
−
∑
v∈Uj+1
kj+1(v)(kj+1(v) + 1)
2(δj+1(v) + 1)
=
kj(vj)(kj(vj) + 1)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
(by 1.1 in Proposition 1)
= 1 = σj. (by Lemma 1)
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• Let now kj(vj) > δj(vj) ≥ 1. We have
B(j) − B(j+1) =
∑
v∈Uj
kj(v)(kj(v) + 1)
2(δj(v) + 1)
−
∑
v∈Uj+1
kj+1(v)(kj+1(v) + 1)
2(δj+1(v) + 1)
=
kj(vj)(kj(vj)+1)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
−
kj+1(vj)(kj+1(vj)+1)
2(δj+1(vj) + 1)
+
∑
v∈Uj−{vj}
kj(v)(kj(v) + 1)
2(δj(v) + 1)
−
∑
v∈Uj+1−{vj}
(kj+1(v)(kj+1(v) + 1)
2(δj+1(v) + 1)
=
(δj(vj) + 1)(δj(vj) + 2)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
−
δj(vj)(δj(vj) + 1)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
(by 1.2 in Proposition 1)
=
2(δj(vj) + 1)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
= 1 = σj. (by Lemma 1)
• Finally, let kj(vj) ≤ δj(vj). In this case, by the algorithm we know that
kj(v)(kj(v) + 1)
δj(v)(δj(v) + 1)
≤
kj(vj)(kj(vj) + 1)
δj(vj)(δj(vj) + 1)
, (3)
for each v ∈ Uj . Hence, we get
B(j) − B(j + 1) =
∑
v∈Uj
kj(v)(kj(v) + 1)
2(δj(v) + 1)
−
∑
v∈Uj+1
kj+1(v)(kj+1(v) + 1)
2(δj+1(v) + 1)
=
kj(vj)(kj(vj)+1)
2(δj(vj)+1)
+
∑
v∈ΓG(j)(vj)
kj(v)(kj(v)+1)
2(δj(v)+1)
−
∑
v∈ΓG(j)(vj)
kj+1(v)(kj+1(v)+1)
2(δj+1(v)+1)
(by 2 in Proposition 1)
=
kj(vj)(kj(vj)+1)
2(δj(vj)+1)
+
∑
v∈ΓG(j)(vj)
kj(v)(kj(v)+1)
2
(
1
(δj(v) + 1)
−
1
δj(v)
)
=
kj(vj)(kj(vj) + 1)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
−
∑
v∈ΓG(j)(vj)
kj(v)(kj(v) + 1)
2δj(v)(δj(v) + 1)
≥
kj(vj)(kj(vj) + 1)
2(δj(vj) + 1)
−
kj(vj)(kj(vj) + 1)δj(vj)
2δj(vj)(δj(vj) + 1)
(by (3))
= 0 = σj 
16
4.1 Complete graphs
Theorem 6. TPI(K) returns an optimal target vector for any complete graph K .
Proof. We will show that, for each j = ℓ, · · · , 1, the incentives sj(v) for v ∈ Uj are optimal
for K(j) when the distribution of thresholds to its vertices is kj(·). In particular, we will prove
that
Sj =
∑
h≥j
σh =
∑
v∈Uj
sj(v) =
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v) (4)
for any optimal target vector s∗j for K(j).
The theorem follows by setting j = 1 (recall that K(1) = K and s1(v) = s(v), k1(v) =
t(v) for each v ∈ U1 = V (K)). We proceed by induction on j.
For j = ℓ, the graph K(ℓ) consists of the unique vertex vℓ and by Lemma 1 and 1.1 of
Proposition 1, it holds Sℓ = σℓ = sℓ(vℓ) = kℓ(vℓ) = 1 = s∗ℓ(vℓ).
Consider now some j < ℓ and suppose that the partial incentives sj+1(v) for v ∈ Uj+1 are
optimal for K(j + 1) when the distribution of thresholds is kj+1(·). Consider the j-th iteration
of the while loop in TPI(K). First, notice that the complete graph K(j) cannot have isolated
vertices; hence, only 1.2) and 2) in Proposition 1 can hold for the selected vertex vj . We will
prove that (4) holds. We distinguish two cases according to the value of the threshold kj(vj).
Assume first that kj(vj) > δj(vj). By 1.2) in Proposition 1 and the inductive hypothesis, we
have
Sj =
∑
h≥j
σh = σj +
∑
h≥j+1
σh = kj(vj)− δj(vj) +
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v) ≤
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v)
where the inequality holds since any solution that optimally assigns incentives s∗j to the vertices
of K(j) increases by at least kj(vj)− δj(vj) the sum of the optimal partial incentives assigned
to the vertices in K(j + 1).
Suppose now that kj(vj) ≤ δj(vj). By 2) in Proposition 1 and the inductive hypothesis we
have
Sj =
∑
h≥j
σh = σj +
∑
h≥j+1
σh = 0 +
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v). (5)
We will show that, given any optimal incentive assignation s∗j(·) to the vertices in K(j), it holds
Sj ≤
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v). (6)
thus proving (4) in this case. Consider the activation process in K(j) that starts with the partial
incentives s∗j(·) and let τ be the round during which vertex vj is activated, that is∣∣Active[s∗j , τ − 1] ∩ ΓK(j)(vj)∣∣ = kj(vj)− s∗j(vj). (7)
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Equality (7) implies that there exist
δj(vj)− (kj(vj)− s
∗
j(vj)) ≥ δj(vj)− δj(vj) + s
∗
j(vj) = s
∗
j(vj)
neighbors of vj in K(j) that will be activated in some round larger or equal to τ . Let X be any
subset of s∗j(vj) such neighbors (i.,e., |X| = s∗j(vj)) and define
zj(v) =


s∗j(v) + 1 if v ∈ X,
s∗j(v) if v ∈ Uj+1 −X,
0 if v = vj .
(8)
It is easy to see that the incentives zj(v) for v ∈ Uj give a solution for K(j). Indeed, each
vertex v ∈ Uj+1 − X activates at the same round as in the activation process starting with
incentives s∗j ; furthermore, each vertex v ∈ X can activate without the activation of vj ; finally,
vj activates after both vertices in Uj+1 −X and vertices in X are activated.
By the above and recalling 2) of Proposition 1, we have that zj(v) for v ∈ Uj+1 is a solution
for K(j + 1). Hence,
∑
v∈Uj+1
zj(v) ≥
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v) and by (8) and (5) we have∑
v∈Uj
s∗j (v) = |X|+
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j(v) =
∑
v∈Uj+1
zj(v) ≥
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v) = Sj
thus proving (6). 
4.2 Trees
In this section we prove the optimality of the algorithm TPI when the input graph is a tree.
Theorem 7. TPI(T ) outputs an optimal target vector for any tree T .
Proof. We will show, for each j = ℓ, · · · , 1, that the incentives sj(v) for v ∈ Uj are optimal
for the forest T (j) with thresholds kj(·). In particular, we will prove that
Sj =
∑
h≥j
σh =
∑
v∈Uj
sj(v) =
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v) (9)
for any optimal target vector s∗j for the vertices in Uj = V (T (j)).
The theorem will follow for j = 1 (recall that T (1) = T and s1(v) = s(v), k1(v) = t(v)
for each v ∈ U1 = V (T )). We proceed by induction on j.
For j = ℓ, the graph T (ℓ) consists of the unique vertex vℓ and by Lemma 1 and 1.1) in
Proposition 1, it holds Sℓ = σℓ = sℓ(vℓ) = kℓ(vℓ) = 1 = s∗ℓ(vℓ).
Suppose now the partial incentives sj+1(v) for v ∈ Uj+1 are optimal for the forest T (j + 1)
when the thresholds are kj+1(·), for some j < ℓ.
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Consider the j-th iteration of the while loop in TPI(T ). We will prove that (9) holds. We
distinguish three cases according to the value of the kj(vj) and δj(vj).
Let kj(vj) > δj(vj) = 0. In such a case vj is an isolated vertex. By Lemma 1, 1.1) of
Proposition 1, and the inductive hypothesis we have
Sj =
∑
h≥j
σh = σj +
∑
h≥j+1
σh = kj(vj)+
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v) = 1+
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v) ≤
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v).
Let kj(vj) > δj(vj) > 0. By 1.2) in Proposition 1 and the inductive hypothesis we have
Sj =
∑
h≥j
σh = σj +
∑
h≥j+1
σh = kj(vj)− δj(vj) +
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v) ≤
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v),
where the inequality follows since any solution that optimally assigns partial incentives s∗j to
the vertices in T (j) increases of at least kj(vj) − δj(vj) the sum of the optimal incentives
assigned to the vertices in T (j + 1).
Let kj(vj) ≤ δj(vj). By 2) in Proposition 1 and the inductive hypothesis we have
Sj =
∑
h≥j
σh = σj +
∑
h≥j+1
σh = 0 +
∑
v∈Uj+1
s∗j+1(v)
In order to complete the proof in this case we will show that, given any optimal partial incentive
assignment s∗j(·) to the vertices in T (j), there is a cost equivalent optimal partial incentive
assignment zj(·) where zj(vj) = 0. Moreover, this solution activates also all the vertices in
T (j + 1). Hence
Sj =
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v). (10)
thus proving (9) in this case.
First of all we show that kj(vj) = δj(vj). Indeed, for each leaf u ∈ Uj we have kj(u) =
δj(u) = 1, which maximizes the value kj(u)(kj(u)+1)δj(u)(δj (u)+1) since for any other vertex v ∈ Uj ,
kj(v) ≤ δj(v). Hence, vj is either a leaf vertex or an internal vertex with kj(vj) = δj(vj).
Let Γj(vj) = {u1, u2, . . . , uδj(vj)} be the set of vj’s neighbors. We have two cases to consider
according to the value of s∗j(vj)
• if s∗j(vj) = 0, then we have s∗j (·) = zj(·). Since kj(vj) = δj(vj) and s∗j(vj) = 0,
each vertex in Γj(vj) is activated without the influence of vj . Therefore, s∗j(·) is also a
solution for T (j + 1).
• if s∗j(vj) > 0, then we can partition Γj(vj) into two sets: Γ′j(vj) and Γ′′j (vj):
– Γ′j(vj) includes δj(vj) − s∗j (vj) vertices that are activated before vj (this set must
exist otherwise vj will never activate);
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– Γ′′j (vj) ⊆ Γj(vj) which consists of the remaining s∗j(vj) vertices.
We define zj(·) as follows:
zj(v) =


0 if v = vj;
s∗j(v) + 1 if v ∈ Γ′′j (vj);
s∗j(v) otherwise.
By construction we have that
∑
v∈Uj
zj(v) =
∑
v∈Uj
s∗j(v). Moreover zj(v) activates
all the vertices in T (j). In particular, the vertices in Γ′j(vj) activate before vj , while
the vertices in Γ′′j (vj) activate independently of vj thanks to the increased incentive.
Therefore vj activates thanks to the vertices in Γj(vj). A similar reasoning shows that
zj(v) activates all the vertices in T (j + 1).

We can also explicitly evaluate the cost of an optimal solution for any tree.
Theorem 8. Any optimal target vector s∗ on a tree T with thresholds t : V −→ N has cost
C(s∗) =
∑
v∈V
s∗(v) = |V | − 1−
∑
v∈V
d(v)− t(v). (11)
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on T . If T consists of a single vertex r, then the
optimal solution clearly has s∗(r) = t(r). Hence, C(s∗) = s∗(r) = t(r) and 11) holds.
Let now T be a tree, with at least two vertices, rooted in r. Let s∗ be an optimal target vector
for T . The optimality of s∗ clearly implies that s∗(r) ≤ t(r). Therefore, the root r needs to
be influenced by t(r) − s∗(r) ≥ 0 of its children. Once r is activated, it can influence the
remaining children. Summarizing, we have that there exists an ordering v1, v2, . . . , vd(r) of r’s
children such that,
C(s∗) = s∗(r) +
d(r)∑
i=1
C(s∗i ), (12)
where s∗i is an optimal target vector for the subtree T (vi) rooted at vi, assuming that each vertex
v in T (vi) has threshold ti(v) given by
ti(v) =
{
t(v) if (v 6= vi for i = 1, . . . , d(r)) or (v = vi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ t(r)− s∗(r))
t(vi)− 1 if v = vi for some t(r)− s∗(r) + 1 ≤ i ≤ d(r).
Let Vi denote the vertex set of T (vi) and di(v) denote the degree of v in T (vi)—trivially,
di(vi) = d(vi)− 1 and di(v) = d(v) for each v 6= vi.
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Assuming by induction that (11) holds for T (vi), for i = 1, . . . , d(r), by (12) we have
C(s∗) = s∗(r) +
d(r)∑
i=1

|Vi| − 1−∑
v∈Vi
di(v)−ti(v)


= s∗(r) +
t(r)−s∗(r)∑
i=1

|Vi| − 1− ∑
v∈Vi
v 6=vi
(d(v)−t(v)) − (d(vi)− 1) + t(vi)


+
d(r)∑
i=t(r)−s∗(r)+1

|Vi| − 1− ∑
v∈Vi
v 6=vi
(d(v)−t(v)) − (d(vi)− 1) + (t(vi)− 1)


= s∗(r) +
t(r)−s∗(r)∑
i=1

|Vi| − ∑
v∈Vi
(d(v)−t(v))

 + d(r)∑
i=t(r)−s∗(r)+1

|Vi| −∑
v∈Vi
(d(v)−t(v)) − 1


= s∗(r) +
d(r)∑
i=1
|Vi| −
d(r)∑
i=1
∑
v∈Vi
(d(v)−t(v))− (d(r)− t(r) + s∗(r))
= (|V | − 1)−
∑
v∈V
d(v)−t(v) 
5 Experiments
We have experimentally evaluated both our algorithms WTSS(G) and TPI(G) on real-world
data sets and found that they perform quite satisfactorily. We conducted experiments on several
real networks of various sizes from the Stanford Large Network Data set Collection (SNAP)
[29], the Social Computing Data Repository at Arizona State University [38] and Newman’s
Network data [33]. The data sets we considered include both networks for which “low cost”
target sets exist and networks needing an expensive target sets (due to a community structure
that appears to block the diffusion process).
5.1 Test settings
The competing algorithms. We compare the performance of our algorithms toward that of the
best, to our knowledge, computationally feasible algorithms in the literature [19]. It is worth
mentioning that the following competing algorithms were initially designed for the Maximally
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Influencing Set problem, where the goal is to identify a set S ⊆ V such that its cost is bounded
by a certain budget β and the activation process activates as much vertices as possible. In order
to compare such algorithms toward our strategies, for each algorithm we performed a binary
search in order to find the smallest value of β which allow to activate all the vertices of the
considered graph. We compare the WTSS algorithm toward the following two algorithms:
• DegreeInt, a simple greedy algorithm, which selects vertices in descending order of de-
gree [27, 9];
• DiscountInt, a variant of DegreeInt, which selects a vertex v with the highest degree at
each step. Then the degree of vertices in Γ(v) is decreased by 1 [9].
Moreover, we compare the TPI algorithm toward the following two algorithms:
• DegreeFrac, which selects each vertex fractionally proportional to its degree. Specif-
ically, given a graph G = (V,E) and budget β this algorithm spend on each vertex
v ∈ V, s(v) =
⌊
d(v)×β
2|E|
⌋
[19]. Remaining budget, if any, is assigned increasing by 1 the
budget assigned to some vertices (in descending order of degree).
• DiscountFrac, which at each step, selects the vertex v having the highest degree and
assigns to it a budged s(v) = max(0, t(v)−|Γ(v)∩S|)), which represent the minimum
amount that allows to activate v (S denotes the set of already selected vertices). As for
the DiscountInt algorithm, after selecting a vertex v, the degree of vertices in Γ(v) is
decreased by 1 [19].
Test Networks. The main characteristics of the studied networks are shown in Table 1. In par-
ticular, for each network we report the number of vertices, the number of edges, the maximum
degree, the diameter, the size of the largest connected component, the number of triangles, the
clustering coefficient and the network modularity.
Thresholds values. We tested with three categories of threshold function:
• Random thresholds where t(v) is chosen uniformly at random in the interval [1, d(v)];
• Constant thresholds where the thresholds are constant among all vertices (precisely the
constant value is an integer in the interval [2, 10] and for each vertex v the threshold t(v)
is set as min(t, d(v)) where t = 2, 3, . . . , 10 (nine tests overall);
• Proportional thresholds where for each v the threshold t(v) is set as α × d(v) with
α = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 (nine tests overall). Notice that for α = 0.5 we are considering a
particular version of the activation process named “majority” [22].
Costs. We report experiments results for the WTSS problem in case the costs are equal to the
thresholds, that is c(v) = t(v) for each vertex v ∈ V . Similar results hold for different cost
choices.
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Name # of vert. # of edges Max deg Diam. Size of the LCC Triangles Clust Coeff Modul.
Amazon0302 [29] 262111 1234877 420 32 262111 717719 0.4198 0.6697
BlogCatalog [38] 88784 4186390 9444 – 88784 51193389 0.4578 0.3182
BlogCatalog2 [38] 97884 2043701 27849 5 97884 40662527 0.6857 0.3282
BlogCatalog3 [38] 10312 333983 3992 5 10312 5608664 0.4756 0.2374
BuzzNet [38] 101168 4284534 64289 – 101163 30919848 0.2508 0.3161
ca-AstroPh [29] 18772 198110 504 14 17903 1351441 0.6768 0.3072
ca-CondMath [29] 23133 93497 279 14 21363 173361 0.7058 0.5809
ca-GrQc [29] 5242 14496 81 17 4158 48260 0.6865 0.7433
ca-HepPh [29] 10008 118521 491 13 11204 3358499 0.6115 0.5085
ca-HepTh [29] 9877 25998 65 17 8638 28399 0.5994 0.6128
Douban [38] 154907 327162 287 9 154908 40612 0.048 0.5773
Facebook [29] 4039 88234 1045 8 4039 1612010 0.6055 0.8093
Flikr [38] 80513 5899822 5706 – 80513 271601126 0.1652 –
Hep [29] 27770 352807 64 13 24700 1478735 0.3120 0.7203
Last.fm [38] 1191812 5115300 5140 – 1191805 3946212 0.1378 –
Livemocha [38] 104438 2196188 2980 6 104103 336651 0.0582 0.36
Power grid [33] 4941 6594 19 46 4941 651 0.1065 0.9306
Youtube2 [38] 1138499 2990443 28754 – 1134890 3056537 0.1723 0.6506
Table 1: Networks parameters.
5.2 Results
We compare the cost of the target set (or target vector) generated by six algorithms (PTI, Dis-
countFrac, DegreeFrac, WTSS, DiscountInt, DegreeInt) on 18 networks, fixing the thresh-
olds in 19 different ways (Random, Constant with t = 2, 3, . . . , 10 and Proportional with
α = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9). Overall we performed 6× 18× 19 = 2052 tests.
Random Thresholds.
Table 2 gives the results of the Random threshold test setting. Each number represents
the cost of the target vector (left side of the table) or the target set (right side of the table)
generated by each algorithm on each network using random thresholds (the same thresholds
values have been used for all the algorithms). The value in bracket represents the overhead
percentage compared to our algorithms (TPI for DiscountFrac and DegreeFrac and WTSS for
DiscountInt and DegreeInt). Analyzing the results Table 2, we notice that in all the considered
cases, with the exception of the network BlogCatolog3, our algorithms always outperform
their competitors. In the network BlogCatalog3, the WTSS algorithm is slightly worse than its
competitors but PTI performs much better than the other algorithms.
Constant and Proportional thresholds. The following figures depict the results of Constant and
Proportional thresholds settings. For each network the results are reported in two separated
figures: Proportional thresholds (left-side), the value of the α parameter appears along the X-
axis, while the cost of the solution appears along the Y -axis; Constant thresholds (right-side),
in this case the X-axis indicates the value of the thresholds. We present the results only for
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Targeting with Partial Incentives Weighted Target Set Selection with c(·) = t(·)
Name PTI DiscountFrac DegreeFrac WTSS DiscountInt DegreeInt
Amazon0302 52703 328519 (623%) 879624 (1669%) 85410 596299 (698%) 890347 (1042%)
BlogCatalog 21761 824063 (3787%) 980670 (4507%) 82502 1799719 (2181%) 2066014 (2504%)
BlogCatalog2 16979 703383 (4143%) 178447 (1051%) 67066 1095580 (1634%) 1214818 (1811%)
BlogCatalog3 161 3890 (2416%) 3113 (1934%) 3925 3890 (99%) 3890 (99%)
BuzzNet 50913 1154952 (2268%) 371355 (729%) 166085 1838430 (1107%) 2580176 (1554%)
ca-AstroPh 4520 67189 (1486%) 198195 (4385%) 13242 183121 (1383%) 198195 (1497%)
ca-CondMath 5694 31968 (561%) 94288 (1656%) 10596 76501 (722%) 94126 (888%)
ca-GrQc 1422 5076 (357%) 15019 (1056%) 2141 12538 (586%) 15019 (701%)
ca-HepPh 4166 42029 (1009%) 120324 (2888%) 11338 118767 (1048%) 120324 (1061%)
ca-HepTh 2156 9214 (427%) 26781 (1242%) 3473 25417 (732%) 26781 (771%)
Douban 51167 140676 (275%) 345036 (674%) 91342 194186 (213%) 252739 (277%)
Facebook 1658 29605 (1786%) 54508 (3288%) 5531 77312 (1398%) 86925 (1572%)
Flikr 31392 2057877 (6555%) 134017 (427%) 110227 5359377 (4862%) 5879532 (5334%)
Hep 4122 11770 (286%) 33373 (810%) 5526 33211 (601%) 33373 (604%)
LastFM 296083 1965839 (664%) 4267035 (1441%) 631681 2681610 (425%) 4050280 (641%)
Livemocha 26610 861053 (3236%) 459777 (1728%) 57293 1799468 (3141%) 2189760 (3822%)
Power grid 767 2591 (338%) 4969 (648%) 974 3433 (352%) 4350 (447%)
Youtube2 313786 1210830 (386%) 3298376 (1051%) 576482 2159948 (375%) 3285525 (570%)
Table 2: Random Threshold Results.
eight networks; the experiments performed on the other networks exhibit similar behaviors.
Analyzing the results from Figures 4-6, we can make the following observations: In all the
considered case our algorithms always outperform their competitors; the only algorithm that
provides performance close to our algorithms is the DiscountFrac algorithm. However, for
intermediate values of the α parameter, the gap to our advantage is quite significant. In general,
in case of partial incentives we have even better results, the gap to our advantage increases with
the increase of the parameter α.
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Figure 4: Amazon0302, BlogCatalog3, and Flikr results.
25
Figure 5: Youtube2, ca-CondMath, and BlogCatalog results.
26
Figure 6: Douban and LastFM results.
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